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1. Abstract  
      
     This thesis‘ main purpose is trying to bring some light over Apple´s international 
taxation system and its tax evasion issue, although I did not want to stop there. I am using 
Apple Inc. just as an example trying to explain a much more relevant issue, which is the 
flexibility and weakness of our current international tax laws, principles and rules.  
Therefore before getting to your innovative company, I tried explaining some other 
popular taxation schemes used by notorious multinationals like the ¨Double-Irish¨ and the 
Luxembourg schemes that were made public of the Luxembourg tax leaks scandals. I 
continue discussion what countries should be doing in response to the double non-
taxation, not forgetting the Big Four consulting companies who play an important role in 
shaping the legislation.  
 
Key words: 
     Tax avoidance, double non-taxation, multinationals, governments, legislation, 
transparency, the Big Four, complexity, low tax jurisdictions, corporate residency, tax 
structure, CFC, international. 
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2. Introduction 
 
     Confidence in our tax system is crucial and at the same time quite hard to be 
maintained, if not every company or individual is paying their fair share of tax. Recent tax 
evasion scandals of multinational companies like Google, Amazon, Vodafone, Apple, 
Microsoft, Starbucks have risen questions like ¨why do multinationals get away with it?¨ 
and ¨how did they do it?¨. You know there is a problem (or an opportunity) when despite 
enjoying a large amount of business worldwide, multinationals pay ridiculously law 
amounts of corporation tax.  
     Most of the multinationals have access and can financially afford significant resources 
to make sure that they minimize their tax liability. There is an important and increasing 
demand for fiscal advising companies, the most popular being the Big Four consulting 
firms, on how to take full advantage of the international tax jurisdictions. The Big Four 
(Deloitte, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PwC), for that matter, employ thousands of 
professionals in the field and earn 25$ billion from their tax work globally.1 
     Nowadays, due to technology, multinationals would need as little as a computer and 
some employees to found a business in a tax haven. Under the present tax rules, this is 
more than enough for them to be able to pay their tax in a low-tax jurisdiction country 
instead of the location where the business truly takes place. This is not moral to 
responsible companies and citizens who do pay their fair share of tax. 
     Each country´s Government engagement in reforming the current international tax 
laws is more than necessary, but the process will most definitely be a slow and lengthy 
one. Until then, the reality is that the companies will continue to discover ways to avoid 
paying taxes where they actually do business and not even. 
     It is believed that international tax law major flaw is that it is way too complex and 
simplicity is key in fighting tax avoidance. A simpler system is in everybody‘s interests.  A 
problem represents what is believed to be the line on the difference between what defines 
tax planning and aggressive tax avoidance. A recent report issues by Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation explains this complexity: ―Tax avoidance has no fixed legal 
meaning, although courts have sought to elucidate it in some cases and, for example, to 
distinguish tax avoidance from tax planning or tax mitigation. Matters are often 
                                                          
1
 Evidence 26,29,30,31, House of Commons Hearing, 44 Report session 2012-13 
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complicated but not usually clarified by the addition of adjectives such as ―aggressive‖ 
―abusive‖ ―unacceptable‖‖.2  
     Taxations schemes, explained next, have become lately a reputational risk especially for 
tax advising companies which, after the late scandals, are seen as the ones who incentive 
tax avoidance, but also for the taxpayers who use the schemes, especially since such effort 
is described in the media as ―aggressive‖ not considering the magnitude of the such 
practices.  
     The main source that will be used during this thesis will be US Hearing Report, 
Offshore profit shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – part 2 (Apple Inc.), by Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs (United States Senate)3 
3. The Double Irish  
    Before continuing with Apple Inc., I thought it would be interesting and very helpful to 
analyze one of the most popular tax evasion schemes among multinationals. I will give two 
example of how countries, in this case Ireland and Luxembourg could be used for tax 
evasion reasons. 
      If we search for countries who represent tax havens, we stumble across jurisdictions 
like Switzerland, Luxembourg, U.S. (State of Delaware), Cayman Islands, the U.K. (City of 
London), Ireland, the Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Singapore, Belgium and China (Hong 
Kong).4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Tax avoidance, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, 3rd December 2012 
3
 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg81657/pdf/CHRG-113shrg81657.pdf 
4
 Tax Justice Network and Forbes ―World‘s best tax havens‖, by Richard Murphy 
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Table 1. - Corporate tax rates table 5 
Tax paradises between 2006 and 2014. 
 
Location 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Albania 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 15 15 
Bahamas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Bermuda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Saba 
      
0 0 0 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Bulgaria 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Georgia 
       
15 15 15 
Gibraltar 35 35 33 27 22 10 10 10 10 10 
Guernsey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Isle of Man 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
Kuwait 55 55 55 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Latvia 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Lebanon 
       
15 15 15 
Liechtenstein 
     
12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Lithuania 15 15 15 20 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Macau 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Macedonia 15 12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Mauritius 25 22.5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Montenegro 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Oman 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Paraguay 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Qatar 35 35 35 35 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Serbia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 15 15 15 
Vanuatu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
   
                                                          
5
 KPMG official website,  tax, Corporate tax rates 
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   For American multinationals to open its path in Europe, Ireland is considered to be one 
of the most attractive countries for opening subsidiaries or the so called ―operations 
centers‖, because of the perfect synergy between the Irish corporate tax regimes and the 
US tax law, which will be later explained in more depth. An example could be that on 
active business income Ireland charges as little as 12.5%6 of corporate tax rate, known to 
be the lowest in the world, and certainly in the EU: 
Table 2. - EU Corporate tax rates table 7 
Global corporate tax rates between 2006 and 2014 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Irish Tax and Customs, Corporation Tax Basis of Charge 
7
 KPMG official website,  tax, Corporate tax rates 
Location 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Austria 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Belgium 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99 
Bulgaria 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Croatia 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Cyprus 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Czech Republic 24 24 21 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Denmark 28 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 24.5 23.5 
Estonia 23 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 
Finland 26 26 26 26 26 26 24.5 24.5 20 20 
France 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 
Germany 38.34 38.36 29.51 29.44 29.41 29.37 29.48 29.55 29.58 29.65 
Greece 29 25 25 25 24 20 20 26 26 26 
Hungary 16 16 16 16 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Ireland 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Italy 37.25 37.25 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 31.4 
Latvia 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Lithuania 15 15 15 20 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Luxembourg 29.63 29.63 29.63 28.59 28.59 28.8 28.8 29.22 29.22 29.22 
Malta 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Netherlands 29.6 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25 25 25 25 25 
Poland 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 27.5 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 23 21 
Romania 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Slovakia 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 23 22 22 
Slovenia 25 23 22 21 20 20 18 17 17 17 
Spain 35 32.5 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 28 
Sweden 28 28 28 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 22 22 22 
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     The reasoning behind a 12.5% tax rate is that Ireland thinks that a low-tax regime for 
corporations will create a lot more wealth and ironically even tax profit when you consider 
its citizens who do pay taxes. Ideally in the future, Ireland will try to work against tax 
schemes like the double Irish by creating anti-abuse or transfer-pricing measures, especially 
since they have encountered some pressure from Europe. However, so far, Ireland joyfully 
accepted its ―loss‖ in tax collection in exchange for an important economic wealth 
generated by foreign investments. As other tax havens, Ireland is a good example of the 
fact that when it comes to taxing business profits, less is definitely more. 
     In 1999 Ireland implemented a regime where the taxable income is split into two 
categories: trading income and non-trading income. In this case, the one that interest us 
most is the trading income that includes income from active businesses and is subject to a 
low, flat tax of 12.5%, which, as already mentioned, is one of the lowest in the world, and 
when combined with a substantial amount of Irish tax treaties, generates a tempting tax 
incentive to create businesses operations in Ireland. When these important tax revenues are 
grouped with Ireland‘s English speaking and high-educated workforce, it is becoming more 
than obvious why exactly Ireland is chosen as foreign business operations center for most 
US technological multinationals.  
     Another great competitive advantage is that Ireland didn‘t apply yet some of the most 
used ―anti-abuse‖ tools present in the tax regimes of the majority of advanced countries. 
An example that could be added to give a better understanding is that Irish tax legislations 
do not contain well specified transfer pricing rules. This kind of rules are carried out in 
other advanced countries with the purpose of making sure that arm‘s-length principles 
apply in related parties transactions. The arm‘s-length principle is the fact that in a 
transaction the parties are fully independent and enjoy equal opportunity.  Usually transfer 
pricing laws are of prime concern for a country that anchors important economic activities, 
because they help protect a countries tax revenues by preventing the diversion of profits to 
low-tax jurisdictions. 
United Kingdom 30 30 30 28 28 26 24 23 21 20 
Europe average 23.7 22.99 21.95 21.64 21.46 20.81 20.42 20.6 19.68 20.24 
EU average 24.83 23.97 23.17 23.11 22.93 22.7 22.51 22.75 21.34 22.15 
OECD average 27.67 27 25.99 25.64 25.7 25.4 25.15 25.32 24.11 24.77 
Global average 27.5 26.95 26.1 25.38 24.69 24.5 24.4 23.71 23.64 
  
23.68 
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  3.1. The double Irish structure 
     One of the most used ways to take advantage of the flaws in the international tax 
system by multinationals, in this specific case by the convenient Irish tax structure and the 
US entity classification rules, is creating a hybrid arrangement that allows technology 
driven, but not only, multinational‘s sales to be made through an Irish subsidiary to outside 
US customers while reducing, US, Irish and worldwide taxation.  This common scheme 
used by multinational is known informally as ―Double Irish‖ and consists of a US parent 
corporation who creates two Irish subsidiaries, ―A‖ and ―B‖. Subsidiary A is usually a first-
tier Irish subsidiary of the US parent company that  is organized under Irish law but 
managed and controlled from Cayman Islands, let‘s say, or any other low-tax jurisdictions. 
Subsidiary B is exclusively owned by Subsidiary A and it‘s organized, managed and 
controlled in Ireland.   
Figure 1.8 
 
                                 
 
     Under the US rules, a corporation is considered US resident based on the physical 
location of the corporation (national)9. Under Irish law, tax residency concentrates mostly 
on the location of a company‘s administration and control activities10. For that matter, an 
enterprise incorporated in Ireland but whose management and control activities occur in 
                                                          
8
 Own elaboration 
9 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, U.S. Code ,Title 26, Subtitle F, Chapter 79,  § 7701, 30(a), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7701
 
10
 Ireland Tax Consolidation Act 1997 ,  § 23A, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0039/ 
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US will be treated for US tax purposes like an Irish corporation, but for Irish tax purposes 
as a non-resident if that company: 
- controls an Irish company that conducts an active business in Ireland 
- is ―controlled‖ by one or more residents of a country with which Ireland has a double 
taxation treaty. 
      ―Control‖ is satisfied by 50% or more stock ownership and the Ireland- US treaty 
qualifies as a double taxation treaty. 11 
     Using these tax rules on the double Irish structure, the result will be that Subsidiary A 
will be considered a Cayman Islands company for Irish tax purposes because: 
-  it will control Subsidiary B, which will conduct active business in Ireland, and   
- will be controlled by the US parent, which is a treaty-eligible resident of the United States. 
     Meanwhile, for US tax purposes, the tax strategy is to create hybrid structures, which in 
most cases are dual residence companies. The idea behind hybrids, as mentioned, is to have 
the same profits treated differently by different countries for tax evasion. Continuing with 
the example, subsidiary B will file a US check-the box election to not be taken into account 
as an entity separate from Subsidiary A. The check-the-box meaning will be explained 
better later using Apple Inc. as an example. As a result of this, Subsidiary A and subsidiary 
B will be ―merged‖ and treated as a single Irish corporation for US federal tax purposes, 
but at the same time will continue to be dealt with for Irish tax purposes as two different 
companies, a Cayman Islands resident corporation and its Irish subsidiary. Transactions 
between Subsidiary A and subsidiary B will have no effect for US tax purposes. 
     In the next step for the application of the Double Irish structure, Subsidiary A will enter 
into a cost sharing agreement with its US parent for the development of intellectual 
property, for example. This intellectual property will be fully owned by the US parent and 
will enjoy all the rights within the US territory, while Subsidiary A will pay the US parent in 
exchange for the rights to exploit the intellectual property outside the US. The US parent 
and Subsidiary A will fund together the development of the intellectual property, for 
example by creating a newer version of the software program. This newly created software 
will be licensed by Subsidiary A and Subsidiary B to produce software products in Ireland, 
latter to be sold outside the country.  
   Under the US legislation, the license payments from Subsidiary B and Subsidiary A will 
                                                          
11
 Ireland Tax Consolidation Act 1997 ,  § 23A(3), available online 
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not be taken into consideration, while Ireland will consider such payments as royalty paid 
by an Irish corporation to a Cayman Islands corporation for the use of the Cayman Islands 
corporation‘s intellectual property in Ireland. At the same time, Subsidiary B will treat the 
royalty payments made to Subsidiary A as a trade expense against its Irish taxable income. 
     Subsidiary A and Subsidiary B may position the royalty payments at the most 
advantageous level to reduce Subsidiary B‘s taxable income in Ireland,  since Ireland‘s  
transfer pricing rules are very light.  The tax applied on the remaining profit will be fixed at 
the flat 12.5%, which, as we said, is applicable to active business profit. The royalty 
payments to Subsidiary A will be subject to taxation in Cayman Islands, at for example, 
zero tax rate. In conclusion, very little or even no tax will be paid on the profit earned in 
Cayman Islands, and only 12.5% tax will be paid on profits earned in Ireland. The next step 
could be for the US parent to repatriate the profit (through a dividend, for example) and 
only then such income will be subject for US taxation.  
   3.2. End of Double-Irish strategy? 
     In 2014, the Irish government started the process of changing its tax code in an 
attempt to close the so popular corporate tax loophole, the ―Double Irish‖. The tax change 
would require the companies registered in Ireland to be tax residents in Ireland within the 
next six years. As it is expected, this will affect an important number of U.S. companies, 
especially the ones in the technology sector.  
     The decision to change the legislation was due to increasing tension coming from the 
European Union governments. During a parliamentary hearing to introduce the 2015 
budget, the Irish Finance Minister, Michael Noonan, said that the aggressive tax schemes 
implemented by multinationals are criticized by governments across the whole world and it 
has damaged the reputation of many countries. Therefore this upcoming tax change has as 
main goal to make it difficult for companies like Apple Inc., Google, Microsoft to gain 
billions in offshoring profit in tax havens such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. 
      EU government responded with prudent positiveness to Ireland‘s legislation changes, 
saying they endorse a policy of forcing multinationals to make changes while continuing 
creating new laws within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). At the moment, The EU is forbidding Amazon.com Inc. to have any tax 
12 
 
arrangements or schemes with Luxembourg, and also alleged that tax schemes 
between Apple Inc. and Ireland could be crossing the fine line to illegal. 
     The new tax changes will be effective in January 2015, although, according to Mr. 
Noonan they won‘t be applied to multinationals currently using the structure until the end 
of 2020.So far, tax advisors and European politicians have been vocal about the lengthy 
period, doubting its effectiveness. ―The transition period…is not very ambitious. It is very 
long.‖ said Lothar Binding, financial spokesman for Germany‘s ruling Social Democratic 
Party.  
     At the same time, Mr. Noonan said Ireland will not change its 12.5% corporate tax rate 
and would introduce measures to convince multinationals to stay in Ireland, where 
especially technology companies have brought in significant foreign investments. He added 
that Ireland will create a new tax rate for income coming from intellectual property, making 
it easier for companies that with that tax change will have to declare tax residency in 
Ireland. 
     In my opinion, with the resources multinationals have they will restructure their 
operations, but will find another way to avoid taxes. It is also quite probably that both 
Ireland and other countries will jump to create other incentives to make companies stay.12 
4. Lux leaks: how to use Luxembourg to save tax? 
     We have probably all heard about the scandal regarding the Luxembourg Leaks in the 
media.13 Hundreds of companies were involved by signing secret deals with Luxembourg. 
The target? To save billions of dollars in taxes. 
     The investigation was led by a journalism group based in the US known as the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in collaboration with 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, the Guardian, Le Monde and more, who over six-months reviewed 
nearly 28,000 pages of leaked documents making public complex financial arrangements 
                                                          
12
 The Wall Street Journal, “Ireland to Close ‘Double Irish’ Tax Loophole” by Sam Schechner  Oct. 14, 
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ireland-to-close-double-irish-tax-loophole-1413295755  
13
 Financial Times, “Leak reveals scale of corporate tax deals with Luxembourg” by Vanessa Houlder, 
November 6, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93e75c1a-6545-11e4-91b1-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cPi0bIUF 
The Wall Street Journal, “New Leak Shows Scope of Luxembourg Corporate-Tax Deals”,  by Tom Fairless, 
Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-leak-shows-scope-of-luxembourg-corporate-tax-deals-
1418177757 
13 
 
with Luxembourg. 
     Companies like IKEA, Burberry, Procter&Gamble, JP Morgan Pepsi, Deutsche Bank 
were among many other taking advantage of tax avoidance schemes and according to ICIJ, 
some of them were paying as little as 1% effective tax on income.  Deutsche Welle affirms 
that ¨The leaked documents included hundreds of private tax rulings - known as comfort 
letters - secured with Luxembourg that gave corporations favorable tax treatment.¨14 
       Of course the Luxembourg authorities have denied signing any "sweetheart deals." 
"The Luxembourg system of taxation is competitive - there is nothing unfair or unethical 
about it," Nicolas Mackel, chief executive of Luxembourg for Finance, was quoted as 
having said in an interview. In a report on the investigation, the Guardian newspaper said 
the methods were "perfectly legal." 
 
      The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) together 
with authorities from fifty countries agreed to make public financial data in order to 
obligate infamous tax havens to reveal the names and fortunes of tax avoiders. 28 EU 
members signed the framework, but not the United States. The deal is expected to start in 
2017.15 
  4.1. Save tax  
     The same as in the Double-Irish, the key in avoiding taxes in Luxembourg stands 
behind companies creating intellectual property and deriving their revenues from 
intellectual property rights. The intellectual property regime of Luxembourg is wide and 
covers patents, domain names, knowhow, trademarks, designs, models, copyrights, trade 
secrets, industrial design rights, and so on. 
    A Luxembourg enterprise should pay on average 29.22% of effective corporate tax.16 
However, the net revenues related intellectual property rights enjoys a deduction of 80% of 
income tax.17 80% from 29.22% results in an effective tax rate of 5.8% on intellectual 
property revenues.  
                                                          
14
Deutsche Welle, “Tax deals with Luxembourg save companies billions, says report” 
http://www.dw.de/tax-deals-with-luxembourg-save-companies-billions-says-report/a-18044340 
15
 OECD, Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information; Background information brief;  29 
October 2014, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Automatic-Exchange-Financial-
Account-Information-Brief.pdf 
16
 Deloitte, Corporate Pocket Tax Guide 2015 Luxembourg, 
http://www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/tax/articles/corporate-pocket-tax-guide-2015.html 
17
 KPMG, Luxembourg - A Hub for  Intellectual  Property, 
https://www.kpmg.com/LU/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articlespublications/Documents/Luxembourg-IP.pdf 
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     The 80% exemption also applies both when an enterprise sells intellectual property 
rights with a profit as well as when they don‘t commercialize the intellectual property 
they‘ve created. Therefore a company who uses intellectual property in its own activities is 
entitled to an 80% tax exemption of the net revenues that they would have been received if 
the use of the intellectual rights would had been licensed to another unrelated company. 
This creates many opportunities for tax advisors. 
     However there are restrictions on the 80% exemption rule. It, for example applies only 
to intellectual rights acquired after 31st of December 2007. Also, this exemption is active 
only for income from intellectual property rights which haven´t been bought from a related 
company, which are the parent companies and subsidiaries. Intelligent tax advisors know 
how to get around these restrictions.  
     Understanding tax schemes is not an easy tasks, since many factors are involved and 
each country has its own rules and principles. A different short explanation on how both 
Luxembourg and Ireland together could avoid taxes. This only emphasizes the hundreds of 
ways that could be used to avoid taxes. 
Figure 2.18 
 
5. Apple Inc. 
     Apple has become one of the world‘s most value tech companies of the 21st century, 
thanks to its innovation and creativity, often setting the standard for the product categories. 
                                                          
18
 Own elaboration 
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One field that Apple has proven to be equally creative is it taxation system managing to 
successfully avoid paying $44 billion from taxation anywhere in the world.19 As most big 
multinationals (Microsoft, Starbucks) rely on the classic Double Irish structure, Apple 
distinguishes from all them by implementing a rather simpler tax structure and not using 
the Double Irish system and equally succeeding in achieving tax evasion. That is the reason 
I chose this particular company as an example, as Apple is a particularly interesting case 
partly due to the relative simplicity of its tax structure as compared to other US 
multinationals, as well as the total amount involved: Apple‘s worldwide gross income is 
equivalent to the California state budget.20 Apple‘s tax structure is difficult, if not 
impossible, to discern from its financial statements (as most companies are). 
     Apple‘s CEO, Tim Cook, affirmed during the Parliamentary Committee Hearings in the 
US that the company ―fully complies with both the law and spirit of the laws. Apple pays 
all its required taxes, both in the US and abroad‖21. However, the $44 billion tax evasion 
has caused outrage in both the US and the source countries where Apple makes solid 
income, but pays comparatively minor tax amounts. 
     According to the single tax principle, ―all income would be taxes once and only once‖, in 
other words, the international tax rules should avoid both double taxations and double 
non-taxation. The reality couldn‘t be far from this principle, since what it is perceived is 
that for tax competition reasons, more than one country are accepting to create norms that 
reduces tax responsibilities on their multinational enterprises in their abroad affairs. 
  5.1. Apple’s international tax structure  
      The goal from breaking down Apple‘s international tax structure is to facilitate the 
comprehension on how exactly does the company create of double non-taxation both in 
US and the countries it most operates. As mentioned before, Apple‘s tax structure is 
simpler when compared to the rest of multinational giants that use the Double Irish 
structure.  
     It all started in 1980, before going public on the New York Stock Exchange. The 
company created 3 main subsidiaries: Apple Operations International (AOI), Apple 
                                                          
19
 Forbes, Apple Used Loopholes To Skip Paying U.S. Taxes On $44 Billion In Offshore Income, Senate 
Committee Claims 
20
 L.A. Sheppard. ―Apple‘s Tax Magic‖ (May 26, 2013) 
21
 Testimony of Apple Inc. before the permanent subcommittee on investigations. US Senate. May 21, 2013 
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Operations Europe (AOE) and Apple Sales International (ASI)22. As can be expected, 
nowadays, the company has a lot more subsidiaries, but this 3 are most important in order 
to understand the taxation avoidance issues.  
     Apple Operations International (AOI) was created in Ireland, although the subsidiary is 
management and control in the US. Apple Inc. has 100% of AOI‘s control. According to 
US Hearing Report, it has just 3 employees, all directors, 2 of whom are employees of 
Apple Inc. and reside in California. Only one employee actually resides in Ireland.23  
     The fusion of both the US and Ireland corporate taxation rules seems to behave in 
absolute harmony as the corporate tax residence complements the US one. Apple 
Operations International is not an Ireland resident, because by Irish law corporate 
residency is only determined by the location of a company‘s central management and 
control. At the same time the subsidiary isn‘t a resident of the US, as the US tax law 
considers the residence of a company exclusively in terms of the place of corporation. 
     AOI has 100% control of the 2 other subsidiaries: Apple Operations Europe and Apple 
Sales International. According to US Hearing report, between 2009 and 2011, AOI 
collected $30 billion in dividends from its subsidiaries, but at the same time has paid zero 
corporate income tax in any country for many years24. Apart from the 2 subsidiaries, the 
only asset it possesses is cash, which aren‘t even held in Irish bank accountants, but in New 
York.25 
     Apple Sales International was created in Ireland as well and its parent company is Apple 
Operation Europe. Like AOI it is not a tax resident of any country, due to the same 
principle explain for AOI. The company began having employees in 2012 (250 in total)26. 
Apple Sales International has different contracts with manufacturers in China to produce 
the goods, and sells those products to distribution subsidiaries in Europe and Asia.27 In the 
majority of cases, those products never physically pass through Ireland.28  
     What the parent company, Apple Inc., did was to sign a cost sharing agreement with 
Apple Sales International (ASI) , under which the subsidiary gets the economic rights to 
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Apple‘s intellectual property outside US, although the legal ownership of the intellectual 
property belongs to Apple Inc. in the US. Explaining better the consequences of the cost 
sharing agreement through an example, in 2011, ASI paid 60% of the group‘s R&D costs 
($1.4 billion) to Apple Inc. as more or less 60% of Apple‘s worldwide sales happened 
outside US. By paying the costs, ASI lowers its income, which ultimately benefits them for 
taxation issues.29  
     The US Hearing Report, by Homeland Security& Governmental Affairs (United States 
Senate), for that matter, brings to light interesting information about this intra-group 
agreement between the parent company and its subsidiary. An audit regarding Apple Sales 
International that compares the income earned and the quantity of costs paid under the 
cost sharing agreement suggests that from the commercial point of view the numbers are 
not logical. In particular, the profits to cost ratios under the cost sharing agreement were 
7:1 for Apple Inc. and 15:1 for ASI.30 My question is if Apple Inc. would accept similar deal 
with other companies under the same conditions. And I highly doubt it would. 
     What is even more interesting to me is the Apple‘s claim in the US hearing that 
―Apple‘s cost sharing agreement is regularly audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
and complies fully with all applicable Treasury regulations.‖31 What clearly occurs to me is 
that either the IRS turns a blind eye on these intra-group sales arrangements, or the 
company manages to hide the truth. 
     All in all, ASI has actually paid corporate tax returns in Ireland, by reporting income 
sourced in the country. However, what we are facing with is another inconsistency when 
we compare the company‘s income to its tax liabilities. To be more exact, the company 
paid $10 million while its income was $22 billion in 2010 and $7 million in 2011 while its 
income was US $12 billion in 2011.32 
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Paid taxes in Ireland 
2010 
Income 22$Billion 
Tax Liability 10$Million 
2011 
Income 12$Billion 
Tax Liability 7$Million 
 
Apple successfully avoided paying any tax on US $44 billion from 2009 to 2012.33 
     In the US hearing, what is implied it‘s that there is no doubt that Apple‘s tax structure is 
in full agreement with the tax laws of the countries involved. However, my personal 
opinion is that the numbers and the results go against common sense. From the 
information we have seen so far the final conclusion is that there is a disproportional 
amount of income booked in the Irish subsidiaries that have few employees and economic 
activities (R&D, sales), and the tax liability rate on the income was very low.  
     As a final conclusion to this part, the success to Apple‘s tax structure is due to the fact 
that the income gained in the Irish subsidies were not taxable in the US, the residence 
country of Apple Inc. At the same time, the income gained in the Irish subsidies was not 
taxable in the source countries where the Apple products were sold to end customers.  
     In my opinion, and the question that I was asking myself most during my research was 
how is this possible and how comes the US controlled foreign corporation regime, which 
was created to apprehend this tax evasion issues,  or other EU institutions, for that matter, 
didn‘t capture this profit shift issues. 
  5.2. US and Ireland tax laws that facilitate the double non-  
            taxation 
      The answer to how Apple achieves double-non taxation of the profits gained in its 
subsidiaries (AOI and ASI) is not due to one singular factor, but to a combination of 
various which perfectly complement each other and play in the company‘s favor.  
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     5.2.1. Corporate residency in the US and Ireland 
     If we pay attention to what the definition of corporate residence is by law, we can see 
that there is a perfect arbitrage among the two, which is too tempting to ignore by Apple or 
any other multinationals. More specific, US define corporate tax residence based on the 
place of incorporation and Ireland based on the company‘s central management and 
control. So, a company created in Ireland with central administration and control in the US 
it basically a resident of none of the countries. 
     Next, according to the source principle, an Irish subsidiary would be liable to pay taxes 
in Ireland only on its profits sourced within its territory. Going back to Apple Inc.‘s 
subsidiaries, as their central management and control is done from US, the nonresident 
status of ASI in Ireland is that its foreign source income is tax free in the country.  
    What Apple does is nothing more than taking advantage of these complementary 
definitions of corporate tax residence and the source principle in the mentioned countries 
resulting the double non-taxation. It´s hard to blame them when their schemes are legal 
and they are not the only ones beneficiating from these arbitrage opportunities, since 
Ireland seems to be the perfect partner for the US to create a company. It‘s interesting how 
for competitive reasons, the states are enabling the creation of these laws, since I doubt we 
are staying in front of a loophole. 
     5.2.2. Transfer pricing rules 
      The cost sharing agreement accentuates an important issue of the taxation practices of 
multinational corporate groups, therefore it´s important analyzing the issue. We have 
already mentioned before that under the cost sharing agreement the parent company 
transferred the economic rights of Apple‘s intellectual property to ASI. As a consequence 
of this intra-group contract, ASI owns the marketing and production rights of Apple‘s 
products for Europe and Asia. Although other subsidies do that, ASI doesn´t have to pay 
any royalties to Apple Inc. because of the division of economic ownership of the intangible 
assets among the two.34 So, although the economic rights are located in Ireland, in reality 
the R&D activities are all carried out in the US.  
    What is important is that all the legal ownership of the intellectual property is owned by 
Apple Inc. in US, which is quite common among big American corporations, the reason 
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being ―the protections offered by the US legal system and the importance of protecting 
such rights in such a large market.‖35 Actually, transferring intangible assets and shift profits 
to a low-tax country is a very common tax planning technique used by big corporations for 
more than 45 years now.36 
     Technically, under the cost sharing agreement, a US company may share with its foreign 
subsidiary the R&D costs on a 40:60 basis, 60% going to the subsidiary, for example, this 
number varying from one company to another. By being liable of 60% of the R&D costs, 
the subsidiary can claim 60% of the income coming from the resulting intangible, not 
mattering the location of where these R&D activities take place, which has already said, in 
Apple´s case it´s US.  
    How does a subsidiary company pay for all this R&D costs, since AOI, for example, 
apart from 3 managers, doesn´t have any employees and it´s basically a virtual company? 
As it can probably be guessed, it´s the parent company who funds the operation and the 
subsidiary, in return pays back as cost sharing payments.37 
     The next issue is why the US Government turned a blind eye to this loophole for such a 
long period of time? The cost sharing agreement was not created so that company uses it 
for tax avoidance issues. The true idea behind it was that multinational corporation cannot 
predict whether its R&D activities will succeed or fail. If the research program is to fail the 
multinationals will lose the invested money. It was assumed by tax authorities that this 
regime will not be used in such an aggressive way as multinationals do nowadays. What 
reality has shown is that for tax avoidance purposes, the corporations abuse this system, 
because by being in the best position to know the risk of a research program (information 
advantage), the companies will enter into a cost sharing contract only if the project is likely 
to succeed, converting this regime in a perfectly legal mechanism to shift profits for 
intangibles out of the US to tax havens. In fact, in most cases the only purpose of a cost 
sharing agreement is exclusively tax evasion reason. 
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     So why the US tax authorities do nothing about the issue? The US Government clearly 
knows about the loophole, but, by wanting to increase US companies‘ global 
competitiveness, it is willing to support the regime by permitting the corporations to 
account their profits, especially if it was created out of US. This, and also because of the 
power big multinational benefit nowadays. In fact, their power is so intense that the 
removal of a tax principle that beneficiate the companies that much can create significant 
political problems. 
      What would be the right thing to do would be to review the issue of how tax 
authorities should treat intra-group transactions, especially in the context of tax avoidance? 
       The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were the 
ones working on the issue. Including a small introduction, the OECD is an international 
economic organisation founded in 1961 and operating in 34 countries to improve 
economic development and international trade. The OECD on its own words ―uses its 
wealth of information on a broad range of topics to help governments foster prosperity 
and fight poverty through economic growth and financial stability. We help ensure the 
environmental implications of economic and social development are taken into account.‖ 38 
The OECD is an international institution where countries can compare domestic and 
international policies, solve problems, and decide on good practices. 
     Coming back to the question, the OECD has been addressing the transfer pricing 
problem for some years now expressing the following: ―transfer pricing outcomes in cases 
involving intangibles should reflect the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed 
by the parties. This suggests that neither legal ownership, nor the bearing of costs related to 
intangible development … entitles an entity within a multinational enterprise group to 
retain the benefits or returns with respect to intangible without more.‖39, argumenting that 
a parent enterprise should not be entitled to receive profits from intangible assets 
exclusively based on a cost sharing contract.  
     5.2.3. Controlled Foreign Corporation 
      The Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) was ¨designed to limit tax deferral of 
certain passive or highly mobile income, including intra-group dividend, interest and royalty 
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payments, and intra-group sales income¨.40 In other words, this regime was created to 
attack the income shifting to foreign subsidies by multinationals, and therefore to avoid the 
evasion of tax liabilities. For that, the regime obligates taxation on specific profits that 
come from foreign subsidies. 
    Saying that, the effectiveness of the regime was put in compromise after Apple and other 
multinationals´ hearings, since it has proved to be highly inefficient in dealing with tax 
evasion. The main reasons behind it is the fact the CFC accepts a series of exceptions, 
exceptions that work perfectly for big companies, including Apple Inc., denying the 
application of the regime. The exception was created because there should be a balance 
between tax collection and maintaining the competitiveness among US companies. It is 
important that the tax system promotes economic growth, therefore the creations of 
exceptions. 
     Just to give an example for more clarity, one of the US CFC exception most used by 
other multinationals, not Apple though, is the ―manufacturing exception‖, which was 
created to exempt income from taxation if the foreign subsidiary was a manufacturer that 
added important value to the goods.41  The logical reason behind this exception was to not 
discourage multinationals from growing their manufacturing operations outside US. With 
time however, if the company could prove that the foreign subsidiary provided important 
contributions to the goods it didn´t matter if it was a manufacturer or not. Also note the 
¨important contribution¨ is also a quite subjective term, quite open for different type of 
interpretations. 
     Applying this exception to Apple Inc., its subsidiary, Apple Sales International could 
perfectly apply this manufacturing exception, thanks to its manufacturing activities. 
However, it is not really necessary since the check-the-box regime is more than enough for 
Apple to evade taxation. 
     The explanation above however highlights how flexible US taxation system is, if Apple 
as a corporation has not one, but two regimes that play in its favor. 
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     The FCF regime caught international attentions, especially from OECD BEPS project.  
It is trying to ―strengthen CFC rules‖, as the OECD mentions that ―the CFC rules of many 
countries do not always counter BEPS in a comprehensive manner.”42   
     All in all an effective CFC regime is crucial in the fight against BEPS, as it protects the 
tax base of the residence country and has ―positive spillover effects in source countries 
because taxpayers have no (or much less of an) incentive to shift profits into a third, low-
tax jurisdiction.”43 Analysing critically the issue, US has traditionally been very influential in 
the direction of international tax rules, therefore it´s not an easy path for OECD in 
achieving its objectives. 
      The curious fact is whether Apple will still apply its tax structure if the CFC regime 
were stricter about capturing the profit accounted in the Irish subsidiaries. Although, with 
Apple´s army of tax advisors, the company would probably find other creative ways. 
     5.2.4. The US check-the-box regime 
      The check-the-box regime is a relatively new one (18 years) and it permits the taxpayers 
to choose between classifying themselves either as a corporation or a pass-through entity.44 
A flow-through entity is a legal business entity that is used to minimize the effects of 
double taxation. The company‘s income is allocated among the owners, therefore it doesn‘t 
pay income taxes at a corporate level but taxes are paid at the individual owners‘ level.45 
     The check-the-box regime was created to ―relieve both taxpayers and the IRS from the 
need to expend considerable resources in determining the proper classification of … 
entities, when classification was effectively elective for well-advised taxpayers.‖46 
     Again, as in the case of FCF regime, the effectiveness of the check-the-box regime was 
highly questionable, since shortly before its implementation, the U.S. Treasury and the IRS 
themselves announced that the regime flexibility was over the board, creating important tax 
evasion opportunities to bypass the CFC regime using hybrid entities. Hybrid entities are 
the one that are elected as a pass-through entity in the U.S. but at the same time are treated 
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as a separate entity under foreign tax rules. According to the OCDE, hybrid entities were 
considered to be one of the principal tool in tax evasion. 
     The check-the-box regime in U.S. in many cases basically disables effectively the CFC 
regime. As mentioned before, the CFC regime was created to grab income shifted from a 
parent company to a subsidiary created in a low-tax country through, for example, intra-
group contracts, and is registered as a separate entity under which each group company is 
considered a separate taxpayer.  
     Using Apple as an example, Apple Sales International provides goods to other group 
distribution companies, which sell the good in Europe. By doing so, an important part of 
the income coming from the sales is shifted to Apple Sales International and the current 
amount should have been subject to the CFC regime. However, by applying the check-the-
box regime for all the subsidiaries AOI (AOE and ASI), the subsidiaries ASI and AOE are 
converted as a part of AOI for U.S. tax purposes.47 Thanks to checking-the-box regime, 
AOI is considered as gaining sales profit directly from the final customers under U.S. tax 
law and the income was absolved from the CFC regime under the active business 
exception.48 As a consequence, the intra-group sales between ASI and the distribution 
companies were ignored and the CFC regime became irrelevant. Or what would be the 
same, the check-the-box regime debilitated the CFC regime by assuming intra-group 
transactions were non-existent. 
     During the US Hearing, at the demand of the US Senate Committee, Apple estimated 
that a total income of $35 billion evaded from the implementation of the CFC regime by 
checking- the-box for the years 2011 and 2012. The amount of US tax avoided for the 
mentioned two years was $12.5 billion.49  
    The possible benefit for the US of the checking-the box-regime is that an American 
multinational reduces its foreign income tax and since it won´t keep the profits outside US 
forever it will eventually repatriate the benefits. But this strategy could back fire since by 
maintaining low the foreign tax rates, the multinationals will only feel encouraged to further 
shift profits outside US. Reality actually shows that the majority of American corporations 
keep their foreign income overseas permanently. 
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     So far, the hearings on Apple and other American multinationals (Microsoft & Hewllet-
Packard) didn´t have any substantial impact on the check-the-box or other regimes in the 
US. The only possible pressure is coming exclusively from abroad, more specifically the 
OECD BEPS project, which in their action plan recognized the hybrid entities as one of 
the main topics to discuss. In the Action Plan, the OECD plan to develop ―model treaty 
provisions and recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to neutralise the 
effect (e.g. double non-taxation, double deduction, long-term deferral) of hybrid 
instruments and entities.‖50 
     5.2.5. Low tax jurisdictions 
      For instance, according to the IMF, in 2010 Barbados, Bermuda and the British Virgin 
Islands received more foreign direct investment (FDI) than Germany (5.11% of global FDI 
for the islands versus 4.77% for Germany) or Japan (3.76%). During that same year, these 
three small ―jurisdictions‖ also made more foreign investments (4.54% combined) than 
Germany (4.28%).51 A study in 2008 found that out of the 100 largest listed US 
corporations in terms of revenue, only 14 had no foreign subsidiaries. Among the 86 
corporations that had foreign subsidiaries, 83 had subsidiaries in tax havens or financial 
privacy jurisdictions.52  
     Now it has to be clear that having subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions doesn´t 
necessarily mean that the companies apply taxation evasion schemes, however tax 
avoidance should really be taken into consideration for having subsidiaries in tax havens. 
    However, again, taking advantage of this tax rates differentials is proving to be extremely 
daring especially since US is known to have kept its tax rate fixed for almost 30 years (Tax 
reform Act of 1986) now at a rate of 35%.53 
     The reason Ireland is a popular low tax jurisdictions are the following: 
 Its corporate tax rate of 12.5%, one of the lowest worldwide. 
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 Ireland is an EU Member State, therefore the subsidiaries created in Ireland could 
take advantage of the EU laws which allow them to avoid corporate tax.  
 Ireland proved to have a quite flexible tax regime for multinationals. As mentioned 
before the Irish definition of corporate tax residence complements perfectly that 
of the US so it facilitates tax evasion. 
     5.2.6. Solutions 
     One of the solutions I would propose for the double non-taxation issue is the 
implementation of the so known enterprise liability doctrine, which is a doctrine under 
which individual entities can be hold jointly responsible for an action only because of being 
part of a group company. Therefore a corporate group under the management and control 
of a parent company is treated as one single enterprise.54 This doctrine is not new, the first 
attempt being in 1933 in the League of Nations report. The advantages of the enterprise 
liability doctrine are that it reflects better the economic reality and also is more effective as 
an anti-BEPS measure. A potent and functional CFC regime would be actually a part of the 
enterprise liability doctrine to a corporate group. 
     The OECD is the organization that through its base erosion and profit shifting project 
is trying to make a change in the system. In its Action Plan on BEPS it has recognized the 
predominance of the separate entity doctrine to the enterprise doctrine is a problem and 
lies at the center of the double non-taxation issue.  
     Another solution would be information transparency about multinational tax affairs. 
There is an important problem with ―information asymmetry‖ between the multinational, 
the tax authorities and the general public. 
     Another solution in the battle between the authorities and the multinationals against 
BEPS, would be a specific disclosure requirement consisting of country-by-country 
reporting. Under this reporting, the multinationals should disclose certain details and 
information about its tax affairs to the tax authorities. This information could include the 
amount of taxable earnings, accounting earning or tax payments each one of the countries 
is operates.55 Information about the book value of assets in each country or the total 
number of employees would also be important to sense the magnitude of the present of a 
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company in a country. If this disclosure would be available, tax authorities in both the 
residence and source country would have been warned by the low tax rate companies pay. 
     Also, the less information about their internal affairs is made public, the greater the 
chance for the company to engage in doubtful actions. If multinational would know that 
certain country-by-country information would have to be disclosed to authorities, their 
incentive would drop if there would be risk of audits and tax investigation. And if 
multinationals would be obligated to make this information available in its financial 
statements, the effect would be even more powerful. Reputation is a primordial asset and 
putting it at risk could be a deal breaker for most of the companies. Apple Inc. for example 
could afford selling their product at such a high price compared to its competence in part 
due to its reputation and how the customers perceive the product. A reputational scandal 
could be of great cost for Apple. An interesting reaction to public anger over tax 
manipulation experienced Starbucks. The company tried to buy peace from an indignated 
public by voluntarily paying 20 million pounds to tax authorities in 2013 and 2014.56 
     This incident states two important observations. The first one is the fact the 
multinational rely on its reputation and it is concerned about it. This is especially true for 
companies who deal directly with customers on a daily basis, since it is relatively easy for 
their clients to simply go to the competence. Secondly, and the most alarming is that this 
type of voluntary tax payments could rise even more distress about our international tax 
system. Taxation should not be voluntary and in fact more than a noble act, it is an insult 
to the current tax system. Conor Delaney, tax lawyer at Milestone International Tax 
Partners, said it "made a mockery" of the tax system. He continues: "You have a 
fundamental principle that you can only be taxed by clear legislation and yet you have this 
process where a company is hauled up and publicly embarrassed and blackmailed into 
volunteering more tax."57 
  5.3. What can or should countries do in response to the issue   
        of double non-taxation?  
     According to the US Hearing, Apple gains 61 per cent of its revenue in foreign 
countries and the rest in US. This numbers could be interpreted as Apple expanding 
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internationally, but when we look at the percentage of the tax rate it pays in US (20%) and 
offshore (1.8%)58, the image changes. This numbers suggest that the foreign profit have not 
been subject to fair levels of taxation in Ireland and any other source countries. The 
problem appears when the company doesn´t pay its fair share in the residence country as 
well. 
    Next, ¨95 percent of Apple´s R&D, the engine behind the success of Apple products, is 
conducted in the United States¨59 and the profits to cost ratio of ASI (15:1) is double that 
of Apple Inc. (7:1) itself60. On one hand, this numbers would most probably suggest that 
the cost sharing intra-group contract allocates a disproportionally low level of costs to ASI 
and that the parent company has shifted profits out from the US and accounted them in a 
low tax country. 
    The problem regarding an international allocation of profits for multinationals is not an 
easy one and so far has no specific or correct solution. As well, there is no international 
guide that allocates the fair allocation of tax rights between the parent company and its 
subsidiaries and obviously between the residence and source country. It should be a 
political agreement between countries, but the conflicting competitiveness among countries 
policy made the process so far extremely difficult in reaching an international agreement. 
Plus is also appears that the US Government has been turning a blind eye on the fact that 
its multinational haven´t been paying its tax fair share. In fact, according to Professor 
Edward Kleinbard, US could have actually strongly encouraged the multinationals success 
in tax evasion61. This tendency of the companies to evade taxes will go on the US expense 
as well this, since as long as the jurisdictions on the source and residence country permits it, 
the enterprises will try to maximize their benefits coming from tax to the fullest, avoiding 
US income tax as well. Adding that the enterprises haven´t only shifted profits from the 
source countries, but from US as well, the final outcome is not desirable at all for the US. 
Ideally United States would respond with a fundamental taxation reforms on 
multinationals, beginning transfer pricing regime.  
      So far the most ambitious attempt to change the present international law was done by 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), an European Commission project. 
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In fact, what is needed is a worldwide tax consolidation system. The answer is a system 
where the multinationals are taxed based on their worldwide net income, while allowing for 
foreign tax credits. But as long as there will be conflicts of interest among the EU Member 
States, the BRICS countries and the US, little progress is expected in the near future, since 
a global consensus would be needed, and such an idea sounds quite utopian to me. Plus we 
should think about the costs that replacing the current international tax law would suppose. 
Nowadays, after a severe economic crisis where is still pay the consequences, extra costs 
will not be very welcomed. 
6. The role of the four firms in providing tax advice 
     There have been many scandals lately where the Big Four consultancy companies 
(Deloitte, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PwC) where more than involved in tax avoidance 
issues. One of the most famous is the Luxembourg documents leaks by PwC, which was a 
financial scandal brought by a journalistic investigation directed by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists. It consists on confidential information about 
Luxembourg‘s tax schemed created by PricewaterhouseCoopers from 2002 to 2010. This 
investigation ended in making public in 2014 tax schemes for over 340 multinational 
companies (Microsoft, Disney, Koch Industries) in Luxembourg. 
     Nowadays the big four firms stand by them not providing anymore the type of very 
aggressive avoidance schemes which they sold 10 years ago, like for example cases they 
have lost in court. This statement is clearly open for discussion but what I personally 
believe is that they have just shifted to advising on other forms of tax avoidance which are 
equally profitable for the multinationals they do business with. The big four firms have 
created internal principles on where exactly the sublime line between tax planning and 
aggressive evasion lies.  
     The power these companies possess is also a factor to be taken into account.  The solid 
relationship the big four firms enjoy with governments generate a perception that they 
could impact on the tax regime that they use to their benefits. According to House of 
Commons (HMRC) the big four offer the government technical advice on changes or 
improvements on tax laws, hence the overall intuition that they are capable of influencing 
legislation to benefit their bigger clients on the expense of smaller businesses. Also, while 
assessing the governments on ―improvements‖ to legislation they get full access and a 
complete knowledge of EU tax law, and also the possibilities to discover loopholes in new 
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legislation.  
     PwC agreed on the fact they are responsible on not taking advantage on their position 
of power.62 In Parliamentary committee hearings in the UK, the big four firms came quick 
to assure that they do not give advice on tax evade evasion, which would be illegal, 
although they recognized that some schemes they provided were ruled against in court and 
would be unlawful to be used  again.63 The companies  acknowledged that the 
differentiation between tax planning and tax evasion using tax laws never identified by the 
Parliament is difficult to define and remains an area open for interpretation.64 PwC and 
KPMG said they had internal guiding principles or codes of conduct to specify what advice 
is acceptable and what not.65 
      According to HMRC, the evidence the companies provided in the hearing proves that 
tax services provided to multinationals and also wealthy people is an impressive industry, 
worth almost $25 billion globally:66 
Table 4.  
 
  PwC Deloitte E&Y KPMG Total 
Global 
revenue due 
to tax 
schemes 
7,944  
million 
5,900 
million 
6,011 
million 
4,860 
million 
24,715 
million 
 
7. The complexity of international tax law 
     The international tax rules are not only complex but also outdated. The 1920s and 
1930s treaties followed by the 1970s transfer pricing models, were founded on the 
correspondent domestic economies, when globalization wasn‘t an issues and companies‘ 
operations and transactions were mostly national. Therefore the laws, treaties and 
principles on which international tax laws are based were not created for the modern 
economy we have nowadays. 
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     At the moment, countries are increasingly using tax incentives to increment their 
competitiveness and to attract both national and foreign investments. Some of them create 
incentives to persuade specific activities, while others act as tax havens.  
     What would make international tax regime more equitable would be to make sure tax 
and revenues are recognized in the right place.  For example, in some US states, companies 
are taxed considering the enterprises‘ global revenues based on business activity, like sales 
level, capital amount or the number of hired employees. 
     The report published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development informs what we mentioned before: those global solutions are needed to 
make sure that tax systems do not unfairly favor multinational enterprises, leaving citizens 
and small businesses with bigger tax liabilities.67 
8. The transparency of companies’ tax affairs  
     There is way too much secrecy over the exact amount of tax liabilities companies have 
and the way this amount is calculated. I believe that companies would measure twice what 
they do if there was more transparency over their tax responsibilities 
     An increment in transparency will increase people‘s trust in the tax regime. Achieving 
this goal is not an easy task though. Ernst and Young, for example, is against adding 
company‘s tax liabilities in their financial accounts, arguing that they are too long and 
complex to offer transparency. They think the information needs to be concentrated. The 
approach they are defending is greater information in companies‘ statutory accounts.68 
     The big four also weren‘t big fans on multinational companies making public their 
turnover, income and tax on a country-by country basis. Deloitte explains that the cost and 
the difficulty of gathering this data would be significant and not in the advantage of any 
multinational, including for commercial and confidentiality reasons. KPMG explains that 
even a trained tax professional would not necessarily be able to understand the tax position 
from this data alone. They continue saying that all internal information can be crucial in 
understanding a tax position and a company might have no tax liability  in a low tax 
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jurisdiction  because it is making important investments and obtaining tax deductions on 
those investments.  Each company agreed that there were better ways of explaining 
companies‘ tax positions.69 
     In the end though, no matter the arguments, the reality shows that greater transparency 
is needs to be provided quickly and should be mandatory.  
9. Final conclusions  
     In conclusion, what can be said about our international tax system is that there are no 
specific codes or rules about where exactly stands the fine line between a unanimous 
acceptable tax planning and an aggressive tax evasion scheme. Nowadays, unfortunately 
multinational are still subjectively interpreting what schemes are ethical and which are not.  
The Treasury departments of each country should create a code of conduct for tax 
advisers, clearly specifying what is considered acceptable in terms of tax planning.  
     Next argument would be regarding that fact that the tax principles, treaties and laws are 
outdated and need urgent revision. The modern economy experience accelerated changes 
and the international tax rules have not changed accordingly to indicate how companies 
operate globally. It has become too accessible for multinational to take advantage of the 
current rules by creating structures in low-tax jurisdictions, which temp them not to pay 
taxes where they truly operate their business and sell their goods. 
     The following argument is regarding the international tax system being way too 
complex.  A simplification of the system is needed. Again, the correspondent Treasury of 
each country should be held responsible to gather all the needed resources, since they claim 
they are always running low staff and financial support, and make more drastic progress in 
simplifying the tax rules. 
     Another big problem is created by big tax advising companies, especially the big four, 
giving their input on tax law. As was mentioned before, the big four firms advice the 
Treasury departments on ―shaping‖ the legislation. This gives a general impression to the 
public that they are able to influence and also manipulate on their benefit the tax policies, 
which is very unfair to smaller businesses and citizens. This only emphasizes the huge 
power that now big corporations have. Although the big four claim their involvement to be 
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minimal, in the line with what the Parliament intends and in good faith, what I, as a citizen, 
am concerned is that this very companies that try to ―improve‖ our tax system are then the 
ones who give advice to their clients on how to use those laws to avoid tax.  This is a clear 
conflict of interest. A code of conduct is extremely needed especially on how conflicts of 
interest should be managed.  
     An eye should also be kept on the transparency issue we are dealing with nowadays. A 
bigger transparency will pressure multinationals to be liable on a fair share of tax in the 
countries they operate in. There should be more explicit details on where multinationals 
make income and pay their taxes. This information should be comprehensible and facilitate 
fair comparisons. Tax returns are indeed difficult documents that are hard to be interpreted 
by non-experts, but this shouldn‘t be an excuse. The problem is that we don‘t have access 
even to complicated documents, for that matter. There is no information on tax returns at 
all. One of the countries who stepped out is United Kingdom who stated ―HMRC will 
continue to work in partnership with HM Treasury to ensure strong standards are 
developed and maintained through relevant international for a such as OECD‖. All in all 
what we need is to improve the quality and credibility of public information about 
companies‘ tax affairs.  
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